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Master's Thesis of Public Administration

An Analysis of Policy Transfer  
Process in Korean ODA Policy  
– Focusing on Country Partnership Strategy –

정책 이전의 관점에서 본  
한국 공적개발원조 정책 연구:  
국가별협력전략을 중심으로

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– Focusing on Country Partnership Strategy –

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# Abstract

## An Analysis of Policy Transfer Process in Korean ODA Policy

– Focusing on Country Partnership Strategy –

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Country Partnership Strategy (hereafter CPS) is a strategic framework for a donor country and an international aid agency regarding the overall official development assistance (hereafter ODA) policy toward priority partner countries. CPS typically includes core cooperation area, strategies in each area, and an implementation plan during a mid-and-long term and is written under the consultation with priority partner countries. CPS was created from international aid agencies in the 1990s and developed as a key ODA policy in the international ODA community, which includes international aid agencies and developed countries. Currently, CPS become one of the indicators which represents the quality of an ODA policy in certain countries.

Korea was a recipient country after the Korean War in 1950. However, on the strength of the miraculous economic development, Korea started to provide ODA through establishing Economic Development Cooperation Fund (hereafter EDCF) in 1987 and Korea International Cooperation Agency (hereafter KOICA) in 1991. Korea was excluded from the list of recipient country of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereafter OECD) Development Assistance Committee (hereafter DAC), which is the international association of developed donor countries in 2000. In 2010, Korea became a member country of OECD DAC. As a late-runner of ODA, Korea actively learned about the ODA policy in international aid agencies and advanced donor countries to catch up with them. In this regard, Korea's policy process for the ODA policy is better explained by the influence of other countries rather than rational decision-making models. CPS is a typical example of the policy transfer. Although the need for CPS was started from the 2000s in Korea, a complete recognition of CPS were formulated after the recommendation of OECD DAC. Several documents about the decision-making process of the ODA policy in Korea provide evidence for such a process.

Policy transfer theory, which refers to a process in which knowledge of policies in one institution is adopted by other institutions (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996), is a theoretical tool that provides an effective frame to analyze this process. Policy transfer theory also provides affluent explanations about policy transfer cases. The representative study of policy transfer is Dolowitz & Marsh's research in 1996, which focuses on actors, motivations,

objects, degrees, origins, and factors for succession and failure of the policy transfer. I analyzed the policy process of CPS in Korea from the perspective of policy transfer theory of Dolowitz & Marsh (1996). Since there are many preceding and follow-up studies regarding policy transfer, this study covers most of ideas of relevant researches, such as Bennett (1991a), Rose (1991), Dolowitz & Marsh (2000), Evans (2004), Fawcett & Marsh (2012), and Dolowitz (2017).

Policy transfer of CPS in Korea was mainly initiated by the bureaucrats in OECD and Korean government. The motivation of policy transfer in the case of CPS in Korea seems to be a mixture of voluntary and coercive transfer. The objects of transfer were the concept, goals, processes, and contents. The degree of transfer was close to synthesis which is in the middle of copying and inspiration. Origins were advanced donor countries, including the United States., U.K, France, and Japan. Policy transfer of CPS seems to be successive in terms of process. However, it did not function sufficiently due to incomplete transfer. This analysis was conducted based on documents of Korean government, OECD, researches regarding CPS. Such documents provide plausible evidence of policy transfer in the formulation of CPS in Korea.

This study confirms several implications regarding Korean ODA policy. First, the influence of international organization is significant in the formulation of ODA policy. In particular, OECD DAC regularly evaluates the ODA policy of each country, which makes each country respond to the document in a certain way in order to

maintain its reputation. Second, the ODA policy in Korea is formulated in a relatively short period of time owing to the policy transfer, thus, such a formulation can cause an incomplete transfer or superficial adoption. Third, policy transfer does not result in an expected outcome. In order to achieve the effectiveness of the policy, continuous efforts should be made after the adoption of a new policy.

This study has several limitations. There are not sufficient data available regarding CPS in Korea. The research of policy transfer depends on evidence which confirms the direct adoption of a certain idea, program, and institution. Most of documents which demonstrate the process of policy transfer are from OECD DAC and Korean government while academic researches on the formulation of CPS are scarce. Additionally, the following factors can weaken objectivity and explanatory power: the studies on CPS is concentrated a short period of time; experiences of the policy-makers are not reflected, and quantitative data has not been utilized.

**Keyword :** Official Development Assistance, Country Partnership  
Strategy, Policy Transfer, ODA, CPS

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## List of abbreviation and acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
BAI	Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
CIDC	Committee of International Development Cooperation
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EDCF	Economic Development Cooperation Fund
Framework Act	Framework Act on International Development Cooperation
HDI	Human Development Index
IGOs	Inter-Governmental Organizations
KOICA	Korea International Cooperation Agency
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO	Non-Government Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
Strategic Plan	Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WB	World Bank

# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Purpose of Study

The aim of this study is to examine the process of ODA policy in Korea in terms of policy transfer. Specifically, this study will focus on the Country Partnership Strategy (hereafter CPS) which was newly adopted in Korean ODA policy in 2011.

The basic assumption of this study is that the ODA policy in Korea can be explained better through policy transfer theory rather than rational decision-making models. Rational decision-making models include the following components: a clear understanding about all relevant goals, values, preferences, the examination of all alternatives for achieving goals, and selection of the most efficient alternative which maximizes the goals (Rainey 2003). However, such a decision-making process might not be applied well in a country in which the modernization is initiated by the government (Bae, 2010). Yoo (2010) argued that Korea has greatly depended on observing overseas cases in formulating policy alternatives. Taking these points into consideration, analyzing a policy from the perspective of policy transfer, which refers to a process in which knowledge of policies in one

institution are adopted in other institutions (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996), seems to be more appropriate to explain the policy process in Korea. ODA is one of the most suitable areas to be analyzed from the perspective of policy transfer because policy-makers actively share their ideas about ODA through inter-governmental organizations (hereafter IGOs).

The applicability of policy transfer theory is supported by the following aspects. First, Korean government had a strong will to learn the system of other countries in formulating the ODA policy. Korea actively participated in the international ODA governance since the 2000s through obtaining the membership of Multilateral Development Bank (hereafter MDB), which means Korea needs to abide by guidelines for such organizations. Second, Korean's ODA history is not rich, thus, the background research for the development of its own ODA policy is not affluent. Korea had been a recipient country for a long time. It has not been long that Korea became a major donor country until it obtained a membership of OECD DAC in 2010. Third, the international organization has powerful tools to enforce their guidelines. OECD DAC examines the qualifications of applicant countries, and it regularly evaluates the overall policy of each member country. In

the case of Korea, ignoring the guideline of OECD DAC is not easy because it is widely referenced in the global ODA governance.

In this sense, the framework of policy transfer may provide the most accurate explanation regarding the process of ODA policy in Korea. CPS is one of the most important policies in ODA area, and is recently adopted in Korea. Thus, this study focused on the formulation of CPS in Korea. Although several studies has been conducted since the formulation of CPS, there is no study which focused on the formulation process of CPS.

Analyzing the formulation of CPS in Korea will contribute to the following aspects. First, it provides the empirical explanation regarding the decision-making process of Korea' s ODA policy. This study examines many government documents, relevant reports, and researches regarding the formulation of CPS to describe the decision-making process in Korea' s ODA policy. Second, this study describes a dynamic relationship between different policy actors in the process of policy transfer. Through observing the progress of CPS in Korea, this study demonstrates the interaction between Korean government and OECD DAC. Third, this study provides practical lessons for the ODA policy through analyzing conditions of policy success in policy transfer. Policy

transfer theory provides several conditions for successful policy transfer. This study examined each condition for complete policy transfer in order to provide a desirable direction for the development of ODA policy in Korea.

## **1.2. Methodology**

This study is a qualitative case study focusing on Korea's CPS from the perspective of policy transfer. Qualitative research refers to a research methodology which explores meanings and insights in a given situation (Strauss & Corbin, 2008). Qualitative research is an effective model which provides an in-depth understanding of a particular social phenomenon (Domholdt, 1993). Qualitative research has the following characteristics: it focuses on words rather than numbers, observes the world in its natural setting, interprets situations for understanding the meanings that people make from day to day life (Mohajan, 2018, 24). Qualitative research has strengths in in-depth analysis, interpreting non-numerical data, providing insight for the causality, and dealing with difficult issues. Meanwhile, qualitative research has weakness in objectivity, clarity, and verifiability (Mohajan, 2018).

Qualitative research is a general concept which includes the



following research designs: case study, ethnography, action behavior, historical research, hermeneutics, ground theory, phenomenology (Creswell, 2009). Among those methodologies, case study refers to “an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a real life” (Simons, 2009, 21). Case studies can be both quantitative and qualitative. Case studies use multiple sources, such as survey results, documents, audio-video materials (Creswell, 2009).

This study adopts a qualitative case study for the following reasons. First, this study focuses on the in-depth explanation of the formulation of CPS in Korea. A qualitative case study is the most appropriate research method which enables an in-depth analysis regarding a certain phenomenon in the society through examining multiple aspects of the phenomenon. Second, the data which will be used for the study is non-numerical, so quantitative approach is not applicable. In order to verify the applicability of policy transfer theory, words which are expressed in the decision-making process are more appropriate than any numerical data. Third, since analyzing the policy process has limitations in utilizing experimental approach, this study focuses on observing the real

situation which occurred in the policy process in Korea.

Policy transfer theory provides a useful framework for analyzing the policy process which was formulated under the influence of foreign institution. Policy transfer theory provides multiple frames, such as actors, motivations, degrees, constraints, and completeness. Policy transfer theory also provides an insight which helps the interpretation of policy transfer cases through analyzing many precedent cases. Among many studies regarding policy transfer, this study utilized the study of Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), because their study acted as a landmark research which synthesized the precedents researches and facilitated follow-up researches regarding policy transfer. Additionally, the precedents researches and follow-up researches on policy transfer will be used for the comprehensive understanding of CPS in Korea.

This study will analyze the written document of the relevant actors in the formulation of CPS in Korea. Official government documents, reports of international aid agencies, and researches on CPS were analyzed for the evidence finding and interpretation of the policy process. Although there is a problem of the subjectivity of interpretation due to the nature of the qualitative study, the validity of the study can be complemented by cross-validation of

the interpretation quoted by a public institution such as an international organization and evaluation of the experts.

This study will deal with the whole period from the introduction of CPS to the current phase. However, as the government documents of Korea which deals with CPS was not published before 2006, a detailed analysis had to be focus on documents published after 2006.

Considering limitations of this study, it may have weak applicability in explaining the case of other countries or other policies in Korea, because this study examined a single case. Second, this study could not examine governmental internal documents on decision-making so it could not fully deal with the decision-making process of CPS. Lastly, since the history of Korea' s CPS is not long, it may be premature to evaluate the achievement of the policy. Such limitations need to be complemented by further researches.

## Chapter 2. Literature Review and Analytical Framework

### 2.1. Research Objective: ODA and CPS in Korea

#### 2.1.1. Overview of ODA

ODA refers to an assistance which is provided from a government or an agency of the government for the development of developing countries, regions, or international organizations. The type of ODA is categorized as a grant and a loan. A grant means cash, goods, and services without a requirement of repayment or redemption. A loan means cash, goods, and services which should be repaid. Only a concessional loan which provides certain favorable conditions to recipient countries is recognized as an ODA loan. Donors provide ODA with various purposes, such as humanitarian, political, and economic purposes. The universal object of ODA is poverty reduction. Additionally, economic development, the spread of democracy, peace-keeping, and sustainable development are suggested as objectives of ODA (ODAKOREA, 2019).

### 2.1.2. History of ODA

The concept of ODA in the modern context began from the Marshall Plan after World War II. ODA had been used as a tool to strengthen the power of each camp in the Cold War era. ODA was also used as a tool of influence on former colonial countries (Hubbard & Duggan, 2009). The goal of poverty reduction became apparent in the global ODA trend in the 1970s. Global ODA governance recognized the need for direct support for poor population, which was a progress from the perspective that poverty can be resolved through economic development. The amount of ODA resources gradually increased as more countries, such as Japan and middle east countries increased their commitment. The expansion of Non-Governmental Organizations also contributed to the increase of ODA. In 1990, a skeptical perspective regarding the effectiveness of ODA was raised because many developing countries did not show a significant achievement (ODAKOREA, 2019). On the contrary, many indicators showed regression of economic development in the recipient countries (Hubbard & Duggan, 2009). Such results and researches (Boone, 1994; Douglas & Hansen, 2001), which support the skeptical perspective regarding

the effectiveness of ODA, facilitated a movement which emphasizes the effectiveness of ODA (Kim & Kim, 2011). In 2000, the UN adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for the universal commitment of member countries towards poverty reduction, universal education, gender equality, etc. Five years later, five principles for the effectiveness of aid were adopted in Paris. The discourse of ODA developed to “Aid and Beyond” , which lead to an adoption of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, which include more diversified issues than MDGs. While MDGs focus on resolving extreme poverties and meeting basic requirements as human beings, SDGs include issues which exceed the boundary of aid, such as industry, climate, and decent work.

### **2.1.3. Overview of ODA in Korea**

The history of ODA in Korea can be divided into two categories: a history as a recipient country, and a history as a donor country. Since the history as a recipient country officially ended in 2000 when Korea was excluded from the list of recipient countries of OECD DAC, this study will focus on the ongoing history, which is history as a donor country. Korea’ s history as a donor country

goes back to the 1960s through hosting a training program for public officials from developing countries. Korean government began substantive ODA policies with the establishment of EDCF in 1987, which refers to a concessional loan to developing countries. When Korean government established the KOICA in 1991, which provides a grant for developing countries, the current ODA system that offers both grant and loans has been completed. Since 1991, Korean ODA has been implemented mainly through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. (ODAKOREA, 2019).

In the 2000s, as the public interest towards ODA increasing, the amount of ODA significantly increased. In 2006, the International Development Cooperation Committee was established under the Prime Minister 's Office as an integrated governance of ODA in Korea. As a result, Korean government obtained a strong momentum for further development of ODA policy. Korea became the 24th member of OECD DAC in 2010. In the same year, Korean government enacted the Framework Act on International Development Cooperation (Framework Act) and devised a Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation (7th CIDC, 2010).

## 2.1.4. Overview of CPS

### 2.1.4.1. The Origin and Importance of CPS

CPS refers to a framework which includes mid-and-long term aid plan towards the priority partner country. ADB (2009, 1) defines CPS as “the primary platform for designing operational programs to deliver development results at the country level” . Many terms are used for naming CPS. ADB also used different terms before it officially uses “CPS.” WB use Country Partnership Framework (CPF) currently. However, WB also uses “CPS” in its news section. OECD officially uses “CPS” in its documents, such as peer review. In this study, we will use the term “CPS” when naming all the similar documents.

**Table 1.** Terminologies of CPS in Different Institutions.

Organization (Country)	Terminology	Period of Usage
ADB	COSS (Country Operational Strategy Study)	(1994~2001)
	CSP (Country Strategy and Program)	(2002~2011)
	CPS (Country Partnership Strategy	(2008~ )
WB	CAS (Country Assistance Strategy)	(1990~2014)
	CPF (Country Partnership Framework)	(2015~ )
U.S	CDSS (Country Development Strategy Statement)	Unknown <sup>①</sup>

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<sup>①</sup> This study could not confirm the period of usage from CIDC document.



U.K	CPR (Country Policy Review)	
Korea	CAS (Country Assistance Strategy)	(2007~2010)
	CPS (Country Partnership Strategy)	(2010~ )

(ADB, 2009; WB, 2019; CIDC, 2007)

When it comes to country level, CPS means donor countries select priority partner countries and provide concentrated aids in core areas. Donor countries can be benefited from CPS by allocating their aid resources effectively (Kim et al. 2013). In the case of international ODA agencies, they do not select priority partner countries. Instead, international ODA agencies establish CPS for all the partner countries.

The current form of CPS was created by WB in 1990. WB used the term CAS, which focused on the management of recipient countries from the perspective of donor rather than a reflection of the recipient country' s needs and priorities (Kim et al, 2013). ADB also established CPS under the name of COSS in 1994. CPS was not released to the public at that time but disclosed to the public from 2000s. According to OECD (2009, 65), most DAC member countries were “preparing country strategies” under the bilateral consultation with the partner country government.

CPS is important for the following reasons. First, CPS helps donor countries to suggest a concrete guideline for ODA and to

manage the implementation in a structured way. Second, CPS encourages the recipient country's ownership of ODA because CPS allows the participation of recipient countries during the process of ODA. Ownership of the recipient country is more emphasized recently. Paris Declaration (2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (2008), milestone principles for the effective development cooperation, include the ownership as the first principle among their core principles (OECD, 2019). Third, CPS enables the consistent implementation of the ODA policy during the mid-and-long term period. Since CPS is a comprehensive framework for development cooperation in a country, it enhances the consistency within the donor country. In addition, CPS increases the consistency between the priorities of donor countries and those of donor countries.

**Table 2.** The Definition of Ownership in Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action.

Principle	Definition
The Paris Declaration (2005)	Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.
The Accra Agenda	Countries have more say over their development

for Action (2008)	processes through wider participation in development policy formulation, stronger leadership on aid co-ordination and more use of country systems for aid delivery.
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(OECD DAC, 2019)

#### **2.1.4.2. The system of CPS**

The system of CPS can be classified into three phases: selection of priority partner countries, operation of CPS, and evaluation of CPS. In the selection of priority partner countries, donor countries consider both qualitative and quantitative indicators to choose the most appropriate countries. As factors of recipient' s sides, needs, governance, and aid experiences are considered. Meanwhile as factors of donor' s sides, objective of aid policy, economic and diplomatic relation, and harmonization of aid policy with other donor countries are considered (Kim. et al., 2013).

The number of priority partner countries are different in different countries. The smallest number is six in Portugal and the largest number is 75 in France. Mostly, donor countries select 15 to 25 countries as priority partner countries. On average, the number of priority partner countries correspond to 19 % among all the recipient countries of each country (Kim. et al., 2013, 37).

Once a donor country confirms priority partner countries, the donor country begins to establish CPS documents. A donor country prepares a draft considering the objectives, priorities, available resources, constraints, and obstacles of both donor and

partner countries. The consultation with partner countries occurs before and after the writing of the CPS documents. Next, CPS documents are adopted by a donor country and administered during the planned period. Typically, the period of CPS is from three to five years. The ODA policy in each country is implemented based on the CPS documents. Lastly, evaluation is conducted for the improvement of the ODA policy of a donor country (Kim. et al. 2013). Donor countries will evaluate whether the ODA project has progressed well in accordance with the CPS and draw lessons from the implementation of ODA in priority partner countries.

#### **2.1.4.3. CPS in Korea**

Korean government began to consider CPS in 2005. At the Cabinet meeting on November 15, 2005, Korean government adopted an agenda which included a plan to establish CPS with priority partner countries (third CIDC, 2008). However, the awareness of CPS seemed to be low in the government until 2007. In the Annual ODA Plan for 2006 (first CIDC, 2006), Korean government used the term “priority partner country” (first CIDC, 2006), but that term did not mean a comprehensive strategy for

ODA, which includes plans for both a grant and a concessional loan. In the first CIDC agenda (2006), Korean government planned to select different priority partner countries for grants and concessional loans. Such a separation demonstrated that the ODA policy in Korea was established and implemented at the level of agency, not at the level of the country. The agenda of second CIDC (2007), which were named “Mid-term Strategy for 2008–2010” demonstrated progressed awareness about CPS in Korean government. “Mid-term Strategy for 2008–2010” (second CIDC, 2007) did not distinguish grants and concessional loans when it established CPS (then CAS). “Mid-term Strategy for 2008–2010” included several elements of CPS, including policy dialogue, aid coordination, selection criteria, and three years of period.

The plan for establishing CPS was more specified in the third CIDC. The third CIDC (2008) adopted “Mid-Term Country Assistance Strategy for 2008–2010” which included 18 priority partner countries, major instruments, priority sectors. However, “Mid-Term Country Assistance Strategy for 2008–2010” did not meet standards for CPS. In “Mid-Term Country Assistance Strategy for 2008–2010,” all 18 priority partner countries were introduced in one document. The needs and strategies for ODA

were written by regional categories, not by countries. Specific grounds for selecting key areas were not provided. Grants and concessional loans were still separated in the priority. There was no evidence that the policy dialogue with the partner country was conducted and reflected.

In the seventh CIDC (2010), Korean government selected 26 countries as priority partner countries by applying both qualitative and quantitative criteria (Table 3).

**Table 3.** Criteria of Priority Partner Countries in the First CPS.

International Criteria (30%)	Economic-Diplomatic Relationship (55%)	Effective Implementation (15%)
Income Level (15%)	Diplomatic Relationship (20%)	Governance (5%)
UNDP HDI (5%)	Economic Cooperation (35%)	Regional Office (7%)
Achievement of MDGs (10%)		Overseas Koreans (3%)

(MOFA Research, 2013, 61)

Korean government also clarified specific principles for the establishment of CPS. Korean government decided to establish CPS under the consultation with priority partner countries and share the draft of CPS like the practice of other countries<sup>②</sup>. Korean government decided to write an integrated form which includes both

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<sup>②</sup> WB and ADB make the public CPS documents. United Kingdom and Japan disclose the draft of CPS.

grants and concessional loans (7<sup>th</sup> CIDC, 2010). OECD DAC (2012, 29) evaluated this movement as “the first template to attempt to integrate loans and grants and is a major improvement on the country assistance strategy format that preceded it.” Korean government planned to allocate more than 70% of bilateral ODA budget for priority partner countries. The proposed CPS establishment due was 2012.

Korean government established the first CPS from 2011 to 2013 for 26 priority partner countries. During the implementation of the first CPS, many problems were observed. According to the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (2015), the selection process of priority partner countries was not rigorous, so great differentials were observed between priority partners in terms of ODA allocations. While four countries<sup>③</sup> obtained 51.4% of bilateral ODA budget in Korea, however, nine countries<sup>④</sup> only received 3.9% (BAI, 2015). OECD DAC (2012) indicated the following reviews: details for aid were not comprehensive; the expenditure plan was not provided; specific objects and plans were absent; measurable evaluation criteria were not defined.

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<sup>③</sup> Vietnam(24%), Philippine(12.8%), Bangladesh(7.3%), Ethiopia(7.3%)

<sup>④</sup> Nepal(0.8%), Uganda(0.7%), Bolivia(0.7%). East Timor(0.4%), Peru(0.4%), Paraguay(0.3%), Colombia(0.3%), Solomon Islands(0.2%), Nigeria(0.1%)



In the second CPS, Korean government selected 24 priority partner countries in 2015. After the selection of the priority partner countries, OECD DAC recommended “the optimum number of priority partner countries to be less than 26” (OECD, 2012, 28), and Korean government accepted this recommendation (21th CIDC, 2015). Korean government also considered many recommendations and advice, including specific objects, the predicted amount of aid in the process of establishing CPS (19<sup>th</sup> CIDC, 2014). However, the second CPS did not change much from the first CPS due to many constraints. The second CPS was established from 2015 to 2016 and will be implemented four to five years.

**Table 4.** List of Priority Partner Countries.

Region	First CPS (26)	Second CPS (24)
Asia (11)	Bangladesh, Cambodia, East Timor, Laos, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippine, Sri Lanka, Vietnam	Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippine, Sri Lanka, Vietnam
Africa (8→7)	Cameroon, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda	Ghana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Senegal
Central and South America(3)	Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru	Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru

Middle East / CIS (2)	Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan	Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan
Oceania(1→0)	Solomon Islands	

(ODAKOREA, 2019)

## 2.2. Theoretical Literature

### 2.2.1. Researches on CPS in Korea

Many researches on CPS in Korea were conducted between 2011 to 2017. Most of studies (Park. et al., 2013; Kim. et al., 2013; Kim, 2015; MOFA, 2013; Lee, 2017; Heo. et al., 2011; Jung, 2012, Kim & Nam, 2016) were conducted under direct or indirect support of the government. Only a few researches (Park. et al. 2017; Cha, 2017; Lee, 2017) were conducted independently from the government. Such a result indicates that researches on CPS in Korea were mainly conducted by a practical purpose from bureaucrats and relevant research institutions.

Subjects of each research on CPS in Korea are diverse. Park (2013), MOFA research (2013), and Kim & Nam (2016) focused on the selection of priority partner countries in the process of CPS. Park (2013) examined critical factors for the selection of priority partner countries in other countries. Park (2013) designed his own selection model and applied the model to a Korean case. Kim (2016) also analyzed the factors of determining priority partner countries. Kim (2016) adopted a regression analysis to test which factor

played a more critical role in the selection of priority partner countries in Korea. According to Kim's research (2016), bureaucratic factors were more influential than political factors in the selection process. MOFA research (2013) focused on describing the global trend of ODA and suggesting a desirable direction for the selection of priority partner countries. MOFA research suggested that Korean government should prioritize human security, enlightened national interest, and ownership of partner countries.

Kim & Nam (2013) examined the operation of CPS in other countries: Spain, France, and New Zealand. Kim & Nam (2013) identified that how to operate CPS can be quite different in different countries. These three countries showed different governance, manuals, and procedures in the process of CPS (Kim & Nam, 2013). However, this research draws important lessons for the development of Korean CPS. Through the case analysis of other countries, Kim & Nam (2013) confirmed that the major principles of ODA, including ownership, consistency, transparency, mutual responsibility and predictability, are important in developing CPS.

Kim (2015) focused on how to provide a technical guideline for the establishment of CPS. Kim (2015) analyzed the cases of the

U.K. and Sweden and provided the following recommendations: considering political factors and constraints, reflecting aid strategies and effectiveness, and promoting cooperation with diverse actors in partner countries.

Park et al. (2017), Heo (2011), and Lee (2017)'s researches focus on specific sectors of ODA. Park et al. (2017) identified some problems in the public administration sector of ODA and suggested alternative indicators for evaluation and specific priority cooperation areas for eight partner countries. Heo (2011) conducted this study for providing data for the establishment of CPS in the future. Heo (2011) collected agricultural data from six countries, which were exempted from the first CPS. Lee (2017) examined the demand for agricultural aid in Uzbekistan and suggested rigorous consideration of the unique backgrounds of CIS countries.

Researches regarding CPS in Korea are not affluent but deal with different aspects of CPS in Korea. However, there is no study conducted in the perspective of the policy process. Prior researches do not provide an appropriate explanation of why and how CPS was introduced in Korea. Researches from the perspective of the policy process have advantages in describing the holistic picture through

focusing on the actors, motivations, and mechanisms of social phenomenon. Although the prior researches did not deal with the policy process itself, such studies would be used in a complementary manner for analyzing the policy process, because they provide useful information about the policy process of CPS in Korea. For the rigorous analysis about the policy process of CPS in Korea, this study will analyze policy transfer studies, government documents, documents of international ODA agencies, and other relevant researches.

### **2.2.2. Researches on Policy Transfer**

Although some problems are unique in one country, more problems which draw attention from most individuals to the government are common in many countries (Rose, 1991). These issues include “education, social security, health care … and a buoyant economy” (Ibid., 4). The confrontation of such common problems encourages policy-makers to learn from their counterparts for a better solution regarding these problems (Ibid). Researches on policy transfer begin from this recognition. The term which indicates above phenomenon is diverse by researchers.

Bandwagoning (Ikenberry, 1990), lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991), policy diffusion (Majone, 1991), policy convergence (Bennett, 1991), social learning (Hall, 1993), and emulation (Howlett, 2000) are used to indicate the similar process. In this study, I will use “policy transfer” when indicating those phenomena. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) introduced the term of “policy transfer” and argued that those terms refer to “a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions in another time and/or place” (p.344).

Most of researches on policy transfer focus on why and how policies are transferred. However, there are nuanced differences between researches on policy transfer. Diffusion studies (Rogers, 1962; Majone, 1991) focused on how communication among neighboring countries results in similarities in policies (Dolowitz, 2017). Rogers (1962) argued that the diffusion process follows S-curve which includes slow diffusion in the initial period, bandwagon in the next period, and saturation in the final period. Although diffusion studies contributed to explain the spread of innovations and the development of technology in European countries, it had the

following limitations: diffusion studies ignored the possibility of unconscious learning, the adaptation process which determines policy success, the role of personalities, ideologies, and politics in policy transfer (Dolowitz, 2017).

Lesson-drawing studies (Bennett, 1991a; Wolman, 1992) also paid attention to how policy transfer occurs. However, lesson drawing studies tried to explain the reason of policy transfer, and they suggested rationality as a major factor of policy transfer (Dolowitz, 2017). While the diffusion studies focused on the pattern of policy transfer, lesson drawing studies tried to explain the driving factor of policy transfer. Although lesson-drawing studies raised other aspects of policy transfer, they also have similar limitations with diffusion studies. Lesson-drawing studies also focused on the voluntary process. They did not pay much attention to the adaptation process, which could be a critical factor for policy failure (Ibid).

Policy transfer studies (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 2000; Evans, 2004; Fawcett & Marsh, 2012; Dolowitz, 2017) tried to explain all similar situations of policy transfer. Dolowitz (1996) argued that the term “policy transfer” is more appropriate than other terms in describing both voluntary and coercive transfer.



Policy transfer studies also provided a framework for the organized examination of the policy transfer process. Dolowitz (1996, 2000) raised the following questions regarding policy transfer: Why transfer? Who is involved in transfer? What is transferred? From where? Degree of transfer, constraints on transfer, how to demonstrate transfer? How transfer leads to policy failure? Such questions provide a clear guideline for the research of policy transfer. Evans (2004) provided a simpler framework with Dolowitz & Marsh' s studies (2000). Evans provided three areas for the policy transfer process.

**Table 5.** Three Areas of Policy Transfer Analysis.

Description	How policy transfer is made?
Explanation	Why policy transfer occurs?
Prescription	How policy transfer should be made?

(Evans, 2004, 13)

Compared to previous studies, transfer studies mainly focus on conditions of policy transfer, thus, they can explain more details about “the process of movement, development, and implementation” (Dolowitz, 2017). Transfer studies has been adopted to examine many topics, including social policy, crime, public education,

development assistance, urban planning, and environmental issues (Benson & Jordan, 2011). Transfer studies also focus on the constraints and conditions for policy success. Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) suggested three factors of the policy failure: uninformed transfer, incomplete transfer, and inappropriate transfer. Fawcett & Marsh (2012) examined a procurement system (Gateway Review process) which transferred from the U.K. to Australia in order to assess how these three factors influenced policy success. These transfer studies also have limitations. Although transfer theories included coercive transfer as a type of policy transfer, most of the studies examined voluntary cases. Transfer studies also neglected politics, ideologies, and tacit beliefs (Dolowitz, 2017).

Although transfer studies still actively conducted in many countries, recently, many researchers focus on the translations in the policy process. (Dolowitz, 2017). These studies (Clark et al., 2015, Peck & Theodore, 2015) also emphasize that policies in one country actively transferred to other countries. Clark et al. (2015, 1) argued policy “moves from place to place.” Theodore (2015, 2) claimed that “Learning from and referencing distant model and practice is now commonplace.” However, these studies focus on how policies transformed in the process of implementation in a new

institution. Translation studies try to understand how the system of the recipient institution influence the adaptation of imported policy and how it implemented in a new institution (Dolowitz, 2017).

Researches regarding policy transfer provide rich insights for analyzing the policy transfer cases. Among these researches, transfer studies seem to provide the most comprehensive perspectives. They include both voluntary and coercive transfers. They provide organized framework for follow-up studies. Additionally, they provide prescriptive insights for the success of policy transfer. Since recent researches regarding translations raise the issues of implementation, such aspects need to be considered when the government adopt new policy from other countries.

### **2.3. Research Questions and Analytical Framework**

The object of this study is to examine the policy process of CPS in Korea and provide implications for the successful implementation of the policy. In order to achieve such objectives, this study will adopt analytical frames of policy transfer studies. Research questions will be reconstructed following the analytical framework.

Among policy transfer studies, Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000) provided a clear and the most comprehensive framework for the analysis of policy transfer, so this study will follow Dolowitz & Marsh' s framework and answer research questions of this framework. Evans (2004) also provided straightforward and comprehensive frames for the analysis of the policy transfer. Evans (2004) suggested objectives and contents of transfer studies. Thus, this study will use a framework which combines the frameworks from Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000) and Evans (2004). Research objectives are description, explanation, and prescription of CPS in Korea. There are three major research questions and seven detailed research questions (Table 6) Three major research questions are: How is policy transfer made? Why does policy transfer occur? How should policy transfer be made? These three research questions include all research questions in Dolowitz and Marsh' s study (2000) except how to demonstrate policy transfer. Since this question is related to the research methodology rather than a research question, I exclude this question from the analytical framework. This study will demonstrate the policy transfer by utilizing documents from Korean government, OECD DAC, and relevant researches regarding CPS in Korea. The studies on policy

transfer and other studies on ODA and CPS will be used for further understanding of the context of policy transfer in Korea.

Most of Dolowitz & Marsh' s research questions can be included in the first research question of Evans (2004). The main purpose of policy transfer theory is to describe the policy transfer phenomenon. However, this study will deal with the other two purposes, explanation and prescription, with similar weight for the practical use of the study.

**Table 6.** Research Objectives and Research Questions.

Research Objectives	Research Questions	
	Evans(2004)	Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000)
Description	How is policy transfer made?	Who were involved in transfer? (Elected officials, Bureaucrats, Civil servants, Institutions, Ideologies, Attitudes/Cultural Values, Consultants, Think Tanks, Transnational Corporations, Super-national Institutions)
		What was transferred? (Policies (Goals, Contents, Instruments), Programs)
		From where? (Past, Within a Nation, Cross National)
		Degrees of transfer (Copying, Emulation, Mixture, Inspiration)
		Constraints on transfer (Policy Complexity, Past Policies, Structural Institutional Feasibility)
Explanation	Why does policy transfer occur?	Why transfer? (Voluntary, Mixtures, Coercive)
Prescription	How should policy transfer be made?	How transfer lead to policy failure? (Uninformed Transfer, Incomplete Transfer, Inappropriate Transfer)

(reconstructed from Evans (2004, 13) & Dolowitz & Marsh (2000,

## Chapter 3. Country Partnership Strategy in Korea and Policy Transfer

### 3.1. Why CPS was Transferred in Korea?

A transfer can occur for many reasons. Many scholars demonstrated various reasons of policy transfer: political purpose (Robertson, 1991), dissatisfaction (Rose, 1991), enforcement of international organizations (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996), externalities (Hoberg, 1991), technology (Bennett, 1992), and the emergence of international consensus (Ibid). Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) believed these factors could be located in the continuum between voluntary and coercive transfer. While Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) introduced voluntary and coercive transfer, they admitted that “at the margin, two types merge” (p. 346). They further developed this continuum in 2000 as follows (Table 7). Evans (2009) also introduced diverse factors raised by other scholars: ideational discourse (Ladi, 2005), the activities of global economic institutions (Stiglitz, 2002), the institution and processes of Europeanization (Buller et al, 2002), international treaties such as GATT<sup>⑤</sup> and

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<sup>⑤</sup> General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

NAFTA<sup>®</sup> (Stone, 2000), and transnational and non-governmental organizations (Ibid).

**Table 7.** Why Transfer? Continuum.

Types	Details
Voluntary	Lesson drawing (Perfect Rationality)
Mixtures	Lesson drawing (Bounded Rationality) International Pressures (Image, Consensus, Perceptions) Externalities, Obligation Conditionality (Loans, Constitutions, Attached to Business Activity)
Coercive	Direct Imposition, Pressure Groups Political Parties, Policy Entrepreneurs / Experts

(Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 9)

To determine which type the transfer of CPS in Korea is, we need to examine the definitions and cases of both voluntary transfer and coercive transfer.

At first, we will examine cases of voluntary transfer. Voluntary transfer assumes that policy-makers make rational decisions. According to the classic model of policy-making, policy-makers have complete information and identify all alternatives to make the most reasonable decision. When policy-makers search a solution for a problem, cases of other countries can be considered

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<sup>®</sup> North American Free Trade Area



as a reference. If some policies are successfully implemented in another country, both policy-makers and voters may adopt those policies as reasonable and acceptable alternatives.

However, it is not common that policy-makers adopt one policy based on perfect rationality. In reality, policy-makers experience limited ability and resources, time constraints, and complex political conditions. Policy decisions are often made by perceived awareness rather than through awareness of reality, and policy transfer takes place in a combined form.

Nevertheless, scholars studied the cases of voluntary transfer. The most common driving forces of voluntary transfer is dissatisfaction with the status quo (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). A voluntary transfer can occur when politicians want to justify preferred positions (Bennett, 1991). The spread of privatization can be an example which supports this perspective. The voluntary transfer can also occur when some institutions encountered uncertainty (Hass, 1989).

Before Korean government received a guideline regarding CPS, Korean government already perceived a need of CPS.

*As ODA increases, effective program implementation system need to be enhanced through increasing policy coordination*

*and integration. (Korean government) need to establish a strategic plan which integrates grants and concessional loans in order to increase the connection between tools and coordination. (CIDC, 2006, 2)*

*Due to the lack of country assistance strategy, it is difficult to implement a strategic and consistent aid policy. Currently, MOEF and MOFA select their own priority countries and carry their program separately. The connection between aid tools and agencies are not close. Aid resources are not managed effectively due to the redundant allocation of budget. (CIDC, 2008, 2)*

Taking above statements into consideration, it was evident that the Korean government showed dissatisfaction in its ODA practice. Meanwhile, political preferences and perception of uncertainties are not found in CIDC documents. In summary, there was an element of voluntary transfer in the process of CPS in Korea.

Additionally, we will examine whether there is a coercive element in the introduction of CPS. The simplest case of coercive transfer is the case that one country forces another country to adopt its policy. However, the occurrence of such direct imposition is not common (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Sometimes, technology played a role as a coercive factor for policy transfer. The U.K. had to adopt the international agreement about data communication in order to be not lag behind in the international trend (Bennett,

1991b). Corporations can exert a coercive by utilizing their capital power (Ibid). Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) argued that supra-national institutions are key sources for coercive policy transfer. For instance, the IMF requires countries to adopt specific policies when it provides loans.

Among diverse factors of coercive elements, the influence of supra-national organizations is the most relevant to the case of CPS in Korea. In the case of Korea, establishing CPS was related to obtaining the membership of OECD DAC. Korean government planned to obtain the membership of OECD DAC in 2005 (CIDC, 2007). The objectives of obtaining the membership were: to improve the international status, to increase the effectiveness of aid policy, and to obtain more public support for ODA. In 2006, Korean government declared to pursue the membership of OECD DAC (MOFA, 2006). In 2007, Korean government examined detailed conditions and procedures for the membership of OECD DAC.

**Table 8.** Requirements for the Membership of OECD DAC.

- 1) Appropriate organization, strategy, policies.
- 2) Appropriate amount of aid (more than 100 million USD or 0.2% of ODA/GNI ratio)
- 3) Monitoring/evaluation system for aid programs
- 4) Promise for fulfillment:
  - speedy fulfillment of DAC recommendations
  - submission of annual statistic data
  - participation in DAC conference and executive group meeting
  - submission of annual report for ODA
  - examination of peer review

At the time, Korean government did not clearly recognize that OECD DAC required its members to establish CPS, so there was no specific plan for CPS. However, OECD DAC recommended establishing CPS in its special examination in 2008. It was evident that Korean government had to establish CPS in order to obtain the membership of OECD DAC (fifth CIDC, 2009). Korean government accepted these requirements. As a result, plan for establishing CPS were specified in the fifth CIDC document (2009). However, this process did not demonstrate that the policy transfer in Korea was a coercive one. A country still have “a degree of freedom to choose the version of economic policy best suited to their situation” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 11), even though it largely depends on critical resources. In this sense, inter-governmental organizations

(IGOs) are “agents of voluntary transfer” while they are acting as “agent of coercive transfer.” The degree of coerciveness can be determined whether the IGOs exercise direct policy or indirect policy. Loan conditions are typical examples of the direct instrument while the information and policies in conferences and reports are examples of indirect instruments. OECD usually exercises indirect instruments such as conferences and reports as main instruments. Thus, the adoption of CPS in Korea had an element of coercive factors, but it was not strong. Korean government still had a degree of freedom but decided to follow the requirements of OECD DAC for the interest of Korean government.

The motivation of CPS in Korea looked seemingly coercive because OECD DAC strongly recommended it. Korean government had to establish CPS to obtain the membership of OECD DAC. However, Korean government were willing to improve its aid policy through learning the cases of other countries. In addition, Korean government still had a degree of freedom in establishing CPS in its way. Taking these factors into consideration, the adoption of CPS policy in Korea seems to have both voluntary factor and coercive factor. To be specific, voluntary factor seems to be more prevalent than coercive factor because the degree of coerciveness was not

strong as the case of loan conditions.

## 3.2. How was CPS Transferred in Korea?

### 3.2.1. Main actors of Policy Transfer

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 345) identified six categories of actors in policy transfer: elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats / civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs / experts, and supra-national organizations. Among these actors, bureaucrats and supra-national organization (here OECD) seems to play a critical role in the formulation of CPS in Korea. In short, the interaction between public officials in Korean government and bureaucrats in OECD DAC resulted in the formulation of CPS in Korea.

Evidence is found both in the documents of the Korean government and other organizations. In 2008, OECD DAC conducted a special examination on an ODA policy in Korea. At the time, Korea tried to obtain the membership of OECD DAC for effective implementation of the ODA policy (second CIDC, 2007). OECD DAC provided several recommendations to Korea.

**Table 9.** OECD DAC Recommendation (2008). (fifth CIDC, 7)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Establishment of effective mid-term aid strategy</li> <li>➤ Selection of integrated priority partner country</li> <li>➤ Establishment of integrated Country Partnership Strategy (CPS)</li> </ul>
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While referencing the recommendations of OECD DAC, Korean government planned to select integrated priority partner countries and established CPS from 2011, which indicated that the OECD DAC played an vital role to make Korean government adopt CPS. Many pieces of literatures about policy transfer focus on the role of supra-national organizations. Rose (1993) argued: “The European Community and OECD encourage exchanges among advanced industrial nations. ... the World Bank and the United Nations agencies focus on programs of concern to developing countries” (p.105). Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) stated:

“International organizations, such as the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, ... enforce similar policies across diverse countries ” (p.7). OECD DAC also exercises strong influences by utilizing peer reviews and conferences. In addition, the reports of OECD DAC are widely referenced by other ODA organizations for the assessment of ODA policy of certain country. Taking these points into account, the role of OECD DAC in the formulation of CPS in Korea can be considered as an ordinary process, which can be frequently observed in policy-making processes in Korea.

Regarding the actors of CPS in Korea, bureaucrats in Korean government seemed to be the only significant actor in the process of CPS. The chairman of ODA Watch argued that CPS policy were formulated in the absence of participation of experts and relevant parties and that the information was not disclosed to citizens (45th ODA talk, 2014). This criticism was supported by the fact that Korean government did not open the list of priority partner countries for the first CPS until 2012. Priority partner countries for the first CPS was decided in 2010 but did not announce the list to the public (seventh CIDC, 2010). Korean government explained that disclosing the list of priority partner countries may cause a



diplomatic problem (PMO, 2012). This shows that there are not many opportunities for other actors except bureaucrats to participate in the formulation of CPS in Korea. Due to the similar reason, most of researches about CPS were conducted by government-related individuals and agencies after the establishment of the first CPS.

### **3.2.2. Objects of Policy Transfer**

The objects of policy transfer refer to what are transferred. Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) stated that several objects can be transferred during the policy transfer, which include: goals, structure and content, instruments or administrative techniques, institutions, ideology, ideas, attitudes and concepts, and negative lessons. Among these elements, this study will concentrate on content considering the availability of evidence. Regarding CPS in Korea, OECD DAC (2008) provided two specific recommendations: selecting priority partner countries and establishing integrated CPS. The recommendations of OECD DAC are related to the content of policy transfer. Korean government selected 26 priority partner countries in 2010 and established the first CPS until 2013.

Although OECD DAC plays as a critical role in the policy transfer, OECD DAC does not establish CPS. The workgroup of OECD DAC observes the cases of international ODA agencies and developed countries and it provides a recommendation based on its observations. Thus, cases of some developed countries were examined for analysis. Documents of CIDC provide the information for comparison.

In the agenda of the third CIDC, Korean government provided a result of case study on the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, and Japan. The result of the case study included the following information: a source of information for the writing of CPS documents, communication methods with partner countries, the term of CPS documents, the number of priority partner countries, and CPS governance in the donor countries. These case studies acted as a ground for the contents of CPS in Korea. In the “Establishment of Country Partnership Strategies for 2012” (12th CIDC, 2012), most of the elements which were included in the case studies were reflected.

**Table 10.** Comparison of Case study and CPS Plan in Korea.

	Features (CIDC, 2008)	Adoption in Korea (CIDC, 2012)
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U.S	USAID local branch collects information.	Embassy, local branch of ODA agency collect information.
	Government utilizes policy dialogues.	Conduct conference of policy
	CPS documents are updated every 5 years.	3~5 years period
U.K.	U.K. has 18 priority partner countries.	26 priority partner countries
	Macro-economic situation, development policy, and bilateral relationships are considered when determining priority area.	Macro-economic situation, development policy, and aid record are considered when determining priority area.
Germany	Government utilizes policy dialogues.	Conduct conference of policy
	Government detaches research group.	Embassy, local branch of ODA agency collect information.
France	Committee of ODA selects 54 priority partner countries and establishes CPS	ODA governance establish CPS for 26 priority partner countries until 2013
Japan	ODA Agency (JICA) establish CPS.	ODA governance establish CPS
	Government conduct a research about 25 priority partner countries.	Embassy, local branch of ODA agency collect information.

Although the case study of Korean government may have some biases, documents of CIDC (2008, 2012) indicates that Korean government attempted to contain all elements of CPS of developed countries. Both the documents demonstrated that many elements of CPS were transferred from developed countries. In particular, the consultation with partner countries, the method for

collecting data, the period, considerations for selecting priority areas, and the number of priority partner countries seemed to be learned from cases of foreign countries.

### **3.2.3. Origins of the Policy**

Origins of the policy refers to “from where are lessons drawn?” Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000) demonstrated various origins of policy: experience, different branches and divisions, other political systems within their own country, other nations, and international organizations.

In the case of CPS in Korea, cases of other nations are identified as a source of the policy. Cases of other advanced countries, such as the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, and Japan, were studied for the formulation of CPS in Korea.

Although the CPS was introduced from international ODA agencies including WB and ADB, their cases of CPS were not utilized as a ground for the CPS policy in Korea. There are no clear explanations of this issue. However, Korean government might think that international organizations are not comparable to the government. In this regard, the international organizations can be a

driving force of a specific policy. For example, OECD DAC recommend Korean government to adopt CPS policy, but OECD DAC has limitations to become origins for lesson drawing. International organizations and countries have different operating systems. For example, WB and ADB do not select priority partner countries. Thus, bureaucrats of Korean government learned cases of other developed countries for benchmarking.

### 3.2.4. Degree of Transfer

The degree of transfer refers to how many changes are observed in a transferred policy. Rose (1993) proposed five categories, while Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000) utilized four categories. Since Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000)' s categories are grounded on Rose' s study (1993)<sup>⑦</sup>, we will use Rose' s frame to analyze the establishment of CPS in Korea.

**Table 11.** Degrees of Transfer (original: Alternative Ways of Drawing Lesson).

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<sup>⑦</sup> Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) just combined “hybridization” and “synthesis” and expressed it “Mixture” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 9). Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) did not explain the reason for merging two concepts. They just stated “We prefer to combine the two related categories of hybridization and synthesis” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 351).

<b>Copying</b>	Adoption, more or less intact of a programme already in effect in another jurisdiction
<b>Emulation</b>	Adoption, with adjustment for different circumstances, or a programme already in effect in another jurisdiction
<b>Hybridization</b>	Combine elements of programmes from two different places
<b>Synthesis</b>	Combine familiar elements from programmes in effect in three or more different places
<b>Inspiration</b>	Programmes elsewhere used as intellectual stimulus for developing a novel programme without analogue elsewhere

(Rose, 1993, 22)

In accordance with Rose's categories (1993), the formulation of CPS in Korea seems to close to synthesis. CIDC documents regarding CPS in Korea referencing many countries. In two CIDC documents, which dealt with the CPS issue, Korean government introduced or referenced the case of other countries. In the 2008 document, Korean government introduced the summary of case studies. In the 2014 document, Korean government utilized the study on oversea cases to support some directions or provide implications, which means that Korean government did not copy the case of one single country. Instead, Korean government tried to combine many elements of different countries in formulating CPS.

**Table 12.** Referenced Countries in CIDC.

Meeting	Agenda	Referenced Countries
3th CIDC (2008)	Mid-term Country Assistance Strategy for 2008~2010	U.S., U.K. Germany, France, Japan
19th CIDC (2014)	Guideline for the Establishment of Country Partnership Strategies	Japan, U.S., Ireland, Australia, U.K.

The adoption of CPS seems to be more than the degree of inspiration. The awareness of Korean government about CPS had been low before CPS transferred from other countries, so the foreign cases acted more than intellectual stimulus. Until 2007, Korean government did not have a specific plan for the establishment of CPS. The 2007 CIDC document only deals with the needs for the establishment of CPS and expressed the need for the selection of priority partner countries. In 2008, Korean government established “nominal” CPS for 2008~2010, but this document could not meet the qualifications of CPS. It was not an integrated strategy which dealt with both grants and concessional loans. In addition, all priority partner countries were shortly introduced in one document, so this nominal CPS document could not be shared or

discussed with partner countries. In 2010, Korean government eventually identified that the CPS should be established in an integrated way and written under close consultation with partner countries. Meanwhile, Korean government also learned that CPS documents are usually released to the public. Korean bureaucrats learned these lessons from the feedback from OECD DAC.

### **3.2.5. Constraints of Transfer**

Constraints of Transfer refers to how hard the transfer is. According to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), “the more complex a policy or programme is, the harder it will be to transfer” (353). This explanation is intuitive, but in order to make the examination more systematic, we need more specific frames regarding the constraints of CPS. I reorganized a framework based on Dolowitz & Marsh’ s study (1996). The following questions were selected based on the availability of evidence and the affluence of discussion in Dolowitz and Marsh’ s study (1996). For example, there are not much evidence to examine the political system, ideologies, and the cost of implementation. The effect of the past policy was not apparent in Dolowitz and Marsh’ s study.



**Table 13.** Questions regarding Constraints of CPS.

1. Was the goal of CPS clear?
2. Are significant side effects perceived in CPS?
3. Was there many information?
4. Was the ODA governance in Korea effective?

### Goal

The goal of CPS seems to be clear in Korea. Regarding CPS, Korean government used consistent expressions from 2007 to 2010. It is evident that Korean government considered CPS as a tool to enhance the effectiveness of aid policy through concentration. Meanwhile, IGOs emphasized the engagement of partner countries. Kim et al. (2013) argued that the purpose of CPS is to establish performance-based aid system and promote the active participation of partner countries. Although Korean government did not show a balanced recognition compared to IGOs regarding CPS, Korean government had a clear and consistent goal at the time.

**Table 14.** Expressions regarding the Goal of CPS.

Time	Expressions in CIDC documents	Expressions in other sources

2007	Strategic, comprehensive aid Harmonization with partner country' s development policy	Result-based management (ADB, 2007) Engage with developing member country (ADB, 2009)
2008	Concentration strategy Effective implementation of aid resources Enhancement of aid effectiveness	Engage in priority partner countries (OECD, 2009) More systematic, evidence-based, selective, and focused (WB, 2019)
2009	Strengthen performance-based aid system	
2010	Effective utilization of limited resources through concentration strategy	

### Side effects

Significant side effects were not perceived in the formulation of CPS. Korean government consistently identified the need to establish CPS for an effective ODA policy in Korea without stating any side-effects. Since CPS is a strategy to enhance the effectiveness of aid policy, only implementing CPS will not have a significant side-effect. One concern was that Korean government worried about the diplomatic effect of disclosing the list of priority partner countries. After Korean government rejected to publish the list of priority partner countries, Prime Minister' s Office (PMO) of Korea argued that releasing the list may damage the interest of the

government (PMO, 2012). Korean government concerned complains from other countries that were excluded from priority partner countries (Ibid), which explained the reason why Korean government did not release the list of priority partner countries. However, Korean government eventually released the list of 26 priority partner countries at the same year. PMO explained that Korean government considered consistent requests of domestic civil society and opinions of relevant ministries. This change of attitude in a short time showed that the concern regarding disclosing the list of priority partner countries was not significant to prevent the formulation of CPS.

### **Information**


Information regarding CPS seems to be affluent when Korean government formulates CPS. First, most of developed countries operate CPS (OECD, 2009). Korean government identified this practice in 2008. At the time, Korean government argued: “most of the advanced donor countries, including DAC member countries select priority partner countries, and establish CPS” (third CIDC, 2008, p.2). In addition, Korean government conducted case studies of the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, and Japan (Ibid).

Second, international ODA agencies, including WB and ADB, provided a guideline for CPS before Korean government formulated CPS. ADB (2007) provided much detailed information regarding CPS, including purpose, principles, frequency, meetings, results framework, and reviews. WB and ADB have been releasing CPS documents from the early 2000s.

### **Governance**

ODA governance in Korea seemed to be a critical constraint when Korean government established the CPS. Korean government provides two types of aid: grants and concessional loans. Each type of aid managed by different ministries.

**Figure 1:** Structure of ODA governance in Korea (ODAKOREA, 2019)



Grants are managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) while concessional loans are managed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF). Each ministry controls aid agencies: MOFA controls KOICA, and MOEF controls Korea Export–Import (EXIM) bank.

Many documents demonstrate the segmentation of two areas. The special examination of OECD DAC (2008) recommended the selection of integrated priority partner countries and the establishment of integrated Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) (CIDC 2009). BAI (2015) indicated that MOEF and MOFA selected their own priority partner countries until 2010. However, CIDC, which is the committee of ODA governance in Korea, attempted to

overcome the segregation.

**Table 15.** The Expressions Which Emphasizes Integrated Effort.

Time	Expression
2008	It is hard to implement strategic and consistent aid policy due to unintegrated country assistance strategy (p.2).
2009	It is needed to establish integrated country assistance strategy for the performance based aid system (p.7).
2010	Korean government will integrate priority partner countries, which separately operated so far and will concentrate more than 70% of bilateral aid to 26 priority partner countries (p.18) Korean government will establish CAS in an integrated way until 2012 (p.19).

In many CIDC documents, Korean government emphasized the importance of integrated effort in establishing CPS.

OECD DAC (2012) also evaluated this effort positively.

*Korea' s latest country partnership strategies (CPS), which integrate grants and loans, identify only two or three focus sectors for each priority partner country. This is a welcome departure from Korea' s previous practice, in which its assistance was spread across more sectors in each of its partner countries. The new approach provides opportunities for loans and grants to support the same sectors. (OECD Peer Review, 2012, 27)*

To conclude, the segregation of ODA governance attributed

to the delay of the implementation of CPS, but owing to the active effort of CIDC, Korean government overcame the constraints of the transfer.

## Chapter 4. Evaluation of Policy Transfer of the CPS

In the process of policy transfer, policy-makers expect that their policy leads to policy success, however, this is not always the case. A program which has produced desirable results in one country may result in policy failure in another country (Rose, 1991), which means that policy-makers need to consider the outcomes of policy transfer for the success of the adopted policy. However, there were little researches focusing the relationship between policy transfer and policy outcomes (Fawcett & Marsh, 2012).

Examining the relationship between policy transfer and policy outcomes has aspects of both explanation and prescription. If we can explain the reason why some policies are successful or why some policies ends in failure in another setting, we are able to provide effective solutions to the learner of the policy.

Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) claims that policy transfer theories need to provide an insight into the relationship of policy transfer and policy outcomes. In particular, they examined which factors are related to policy failure, and argued that “at least three factors have significant effects on policy transfer” : uninformed, incomplete and inappropriate transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 17).

**Table 16.** Three Factors of Policy Failure in Policy Transfer.

Types	Situation
Uninformed Transfer	The borrowing country may have insufficient information about the policy/institution and how it operates in the country from which it is transferred.
Incomplete Transfer	Crucial elements of what made the policy or institutional structure a success in the originating country may not transferred.
Inappropriate Transfer	Insufficient attention may be paid to the differences between the economic, social, political and ideological contexts in the transferring and the borrowing country.

(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 17)



In order to apply Dolowitz & Marsh' s frame which deals with the factors of policy failure (2000), we need to assess whether CPS in Korea is success or failure. However, the criteria to tell whether CPS is a success or failure is not clear. Fawcett and Marsh (2012) suggested two types of approach: a process dimension and a programmatic dimension. According to Fawcett & Marsh, policy transfer might be a success in terms of the process dimension but might be a failure in terms of the programmatic dimension. In this sense, we will discuss both aspects of success when we evaluate/ examine the outcome of policy transfer.

**Table 17.** Two Dimensions of Policy Success.

Dimension	Focus	Evidence
Process	Was the transfer successful in the sense that the process was accomplished with few problems?	The number of institutions which imported the same policy, Public belief, Combined support of politicians and bureaucrats
Programmatic	Was the transferred policy, once introduced into the new jurisdiction, successful in achieving its objectives?	Saving of money, Reports of independent audit office, Comments of credible individuals,

		Academic research
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(Processed from Fawcett & Marsh, 2012, 165; 170)

Then, there is an issue of how to search the evidence of success or failure. Some changes of indicators or evaluations of relevant documents might be provided as evidence of policy success or failure. Fawcett and Marsh' s study (2012) used five main data sources to evaluate policy outcomes: government literature, reviews of auditing office, media coverage, published literature, and interviews of key policy actors. Similarly, I will utilize the government documents in CIDC and BAI, Peer reviews of OECD, and NGO' s opinion regarding CPS.

## 4.1. Progress Dimension

Korean government specified the due of the establishment of first CPSs to 2012 (CIDC, 2010). Korean government formed a task force in which PMO, MOEF, MOFA, KoreaExim Bank, and KOICA<sup>®</sup> were included for the establishment of CPS. In this process, PMO acted as a facilitator which initially established one CPS document

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<sup>®</sup> KoreaExim Bank and KOICA support and implement the ODA policy under the supervision of MOEF and MOFA respectively.

of one country as a model. Although the process has delayed for one year, Korean government completed the establishment of first CPS.

**Table 18.** Times for the Establishment of the First CPS

Year	Countries
2011 (3)	Vietnam, Ghana, Solomon Islands
2012 (11)	Bolivia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, DR Congo, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Philippine, Uzbekistan
2013 (12)	Laos, Mozambique, Peru, Cameroon, Colombia, Nigeria, Nepal, East Timor, Rwanda, Uganda, Paraguay, Pakistan

(ODAKOREA, 2019)

Korea also met the requirement of OECD DAC' s recommendation which specified the selection of integrated priority partner countries and the establishment of integrated CPS documents. OECD DAC evaluated Korean government' s effort in its 2012 peer review.

*Korea' s latest country partnership strategies (CPS), which integrate grants and loans, identify only two or three focus sectors for each priority partner country. This is a welcome departure from Korea' s previous practice, in which its assistance was spread across more sectors in each of its partner countries.*

*(OECD Peer Review, 2012, 27)*

*The introduction of country partnership strategies (CPS) that, for the first time, bring together Korea' s grants and loans into one document. (Ibid, 63)*

Kim (2013) also assessed that “the PMO’ s guideline of CPS document, the decision for the fulfillment, transparency, and enhancement of communication with partner countries are similar with other countries so seems to be positive” (p.7).

However, the positive evaluation did not mean that there were no problems in process dimension. Many problems were raised regarding the process of CPS in Korea. CIDC (2012) specified problems which the government encountered in the process of CPS: difficulties in coordination with relevant countries, an insufficient reflection of relevant ministries’ opinion, and difficulties in policy dialogue with partner countries due to the time constraint, conflicts of schedule among delegates (p.30). BAI (2015) indicated that some priority partner countries were not targets of concessional loans and that some key elements were absent in CPS documents. ODA Watch (2014) criticized that the government monopolized the process of CPS. OECD DAC raised a similar problem in its 2018 peer review.

*Overall, without ensuring government plans have been subject to broader multi-stakeholder consultation, Korea risks supporting projects within the framework of the CPS that give inadequate attention to context, sustainable development results and recurrent costs (OECD DAC Peer Review, 2018, 117).*

Korean government formulated the similar appearance of CPS with that of advanced donor countries, but many problems were raised in the process of CPS. However, most of these problems were related to technical problems, which might be addressed in the future. Kim (2013) also expressed that measures for addressing problems of CPS, such as the incompleteness of CPS documents and insufficient communication with partner countries, should be “complemented” in the future (p.7). Thus, measures for the completeness of policy transfer need to be implemented for the success of CPS. Overall, the CPS in Korea is close to a success in terms of progress but has many minor issues to be addressed.

## **4.2. Programmatic Dimension**

Assessing the policy outcomes in a programmatic dimension begins with identifying the objects of the policy. In the case of CPS, the effectiveness of the ODA policy is the most important object. Although IGOs suggests that the participation and ownership of

recipient countries are also major objects, it ultimately aims the effectiveness of ODA policy. A landmark consensus of international society - Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) - places ownership as one of its principles for aid effectiveness.

**Table 19.** Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005)

Principles	Meaning
Ownership	Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.
Alignment	Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.
Harmonisation	Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.
Results	Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured.
Mutual accountability	Donors and partners are accountable for development results.

However, CPS is not a specific program which directly generates specific outcomes. In fact, CPS is a framework which promotes the strategic implementation of the ODA policy. That is why WB uses “Country Partnership Framework” for the same document of CPS. CPS documents usually include a frame which assesses performance and outcomes of the ODA policy in each country.

**Table 20.** Result Framework in CPS with Philippines (ADB, 2018, 16)

<b>Country Development Impact Indicators with which the CPS is Aligned</b>				
1. Overall poverty rate will decline from 21.6% in 2015 to 14.0% in 2022 2. Per capita income will increase from \$3,550 in 2015 to \$5,000 in 2022 3. Unemployment will decline from 5.5% in 2016 to 3.0%- 5.0% in 2022				
CPS Objectives and Related Impacts	CPS Priority Areas	Key Outcomes that ADB Contributes to	Outcome Indicators	CPS Resources
Accelerating infra-structure and long-term investments	Infra-structure policy and finance	Access to economic opportunities increased	Percentile ranking in the Global Infrastructure Competitiveness Ranking improved in 2022 (2016 baseline: 97)	Ongoing portfolio Ongoing sovereign projects (as of 30 June 2018): Number: 6 Amount: \$821 million  Planned operations and contribution:  Sovereign Lending: \$3,525 million of regular OCR and \$1,003 million of co-financing for 2018- 2021  Grant: \$5 million from the Urban Climate Change Resilience Trust Fund in 2018
	Institutional capacity development	Spending on public infra-structure increased	Public infrastructure spending increased to 7.4% of GDP in 2022a (2017 baseline: 5.4%)	

This means that CPS is close to the instrument for evaluating the effectiveness of the ODA policy rather than the target of assessment. Since the outcome of CPS cannot be directly measured, our research needs to focus on the functional aspects of

CPS. The functions of CPS are closely related to the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. WB (2000) and ADB (2010) suggest CPS as a key instrument for operationalizing the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

From the concept of the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness, I created the following questions with regard to the assessment of CPS.

- (Ownership) Does CPS promote an active participation of developing countries?
- (Alignment) Does CPS increase the consistency of the aid policy?
- (Harmonization) Does CPS prevent overlapping aid?
- (Results) Does CPS encourage both parties to pursue the same results?
- (Mutual Accountability) Does CPS increase mutual trust?

We can evaluate the outcome of the CPS based on these questions. Literature, which deals with the CPS, provides evidence for the assessment of the CPS.

**Table 21.** Assessments regarding the Programmatic Aspects of CPS in Korea

Principles	Articles	Sources
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Ownership	<p>1) Its policy documents give relatively clear guidance for how it engages in partner countries</p> <p>2) Korea should strengthen ... its strategic view of its unique contribution to each country context. This may include: deepening policy dialogue with partner governments...</p> <p>3) Policy dialogue with partner countries was not sufficient in the process of CPS.</p> <p>4) Communication with partner countries seems to be insufficient in the process of CPS.</p>	<p>OECD DAC, 2018, 42</p> <p>OECD DAC, 2018, 21</p> <p>ODA Watch, 2014, 22</p> <p>MOFA research, 2013, 83</p>
Alignment	<p>1) Korea' s development assistance is highly valued by the Government of Cambodia as it is demand-driven and in line with Cambodia' s priorities.</p>	<p>OECD DAC, 2018, 112</p>
Harmoni- zation	<p>1) The CPS also defines a clear division of labour among the main Korean actors at country level involved in managing Korea' s ODA.</p> <p>2) Due to insufficient strategy, effective and systematic aid implementation are hampered.</p>	<p>OECD DAC, 2018, 112</p> <p>BAI, 2015, 18</p>
Results	<p>1) Current CPS fails to provide specific performance objectives and evaluation indicators.</p> <p>2) Most of CPS in Korea did not provide specific plan and objectives which is needed for the effectiveness of aid policy</p>	<p>MOFA research, 2015, 83</p> <p>CICD, 2014, 13</p>
Mutual account- ability	<p>1) Nor does it provide an indicative budget for Korea' s development co-operation or offer clarity on how implementation partners are selected.</p>	<p>OECD DAC, 2018, 112-113</p>

	2) These country strategies would serve as an even more effective tool for accountability and planning if they included: (i) an indicative budget for the strategy period, (ii) objectives for policy dialogue with partner country governments ...	OECD DAC, 2018, 20
	3) Due to the decentralization of ODA governance, the trust of ODA policy damaged.	ODA Watch, 2014, 22
	4) CPS is not being operated faithfully.	BAI, 2015, 13
	5) Operational strategy and business plan are not suggested in the CPS of Korea	MOFA research, 2015, vii

Literatures evaluating CPS in Korea includes both positive assessments and negative assessments. First, current CPS articulates procedures for the participation of partner countries but does not provide ample opportunities for in-depth communication. Second, there is one literature (OECD, 2018) about the alignment, which evaluated that CPS in Korea aligned well with a partner country. Third, OECD (2018) assessed that there was a clear division of labor among actors, but BAI raised the problem of an ineffective implementing system. Fourth, CPS in Korea does not provide specific results in its CPS documents. Fifth, CPS in Korea has a weakness in accountability due to lack of required information, decentralization of its ODA governance, and operational strategy.

Though there are some positive comments regarding the

outcomes of CPS, CPS in Korea demonstrated insufficient performance from the perspective of programmatic dimension. Among the factors of policy failure in Dolowitz & Marsh (2000)'s study, which includes uninformed, incomplete, and inappropriate transfer, the case of CPS in Korea is close to incomplete transfer. Since many countries and IGOs already have been implementing CPS, a lack of information might not be a critical factor. The inappropriate transfer may not be applied to the case of CPS in Korea, because Korean government still has a significant level of discretion in establishing CPS. Although OECD DAC assessed the CPS in Korea in diverse aspects, such assessments were close to direction rather than specific contents. In addition, since each country establishes a different style of CPS, Korea also could establish the most appropriate type of CPS in Korea. To summarize, CPS in Korea is close to incomplete policy transfer and was not successful in terms of programmatic dimension.

Then, what factors contribute to transfer in the establishment of CPS in Korea? Incomplete transfer refers to a situation that crucial elements of the policy are not transferred (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). When it comes to CPS, policy dialogue with partner countries, consultation with relevant organizations,

tools for enforcement, and monitoring process are suggested as crucial elements. As many documents from OECD DAC and Korean government demonstrate, CPS in Korea meets formal requirements of CPS, however, the elements of CPS do not function as expected. As I discussed in programmatic approach, CPS in Korea seems to miss several crucial elements of CPS. Policy dialogue is not enough to develop in-depth communications. Implementation system is weak. Lack of appropriate monitoring system results in the low level of accountability of both countries.

Theories of policy transfer do not provide general explanations about the reason why crucial elements are not adopted in the process of policy transfer. In the case studies of policy transfer, reasons for incomplete transfer are specific to each issue. For example, in the case study of Gateway Review Process (Fawcett & Marsh, 2012), reluctance of the private sector, possible conflicts of interests, and non-participation of Treasury are suggested as reasons for incomplete policy transfer. In a similar vein, the specific context needs to be examined in order to find the reasons for incomplete transfer.

Many documents examined in this study provide plausible clues for incomplete transfer. Lee (2014) raises the problem of

exclusive policy process in the formulation of CPS. Korean government did not provide sufficient opportunities for participation to civil society and relevant parties. This exclusive policy making process seemed to contribute to speedy adoption of CPS, however, Korean government sacrificed the opportunities for formation of social consensus and utilization from diverse parties (Ibid). Jeong (2014) raises the same problem in the process of CPS in Korea. In addition, Jeong (2014) argues that the participation of branch offices of Korean government and that of stakeholders of partner countries should be expanded for the effectiveness of CPS. Overall, Korean government overlooked the importance of participation from diverse actors, thus, it sacrificed opportunities for valuable feedbacks and further improvement.

Project-based approach in ODA process also acts as obstacle for complete transfer of CPS (Lee, 2014; Jeong, 2014). Though Korean government emphasizes the strategic allocation of ODA resources, actual implementation of ODA resources are still based on individual projects. This practice significantly hampers the strategic utilization of ODA resources. According to the research of MOFA (2013), project-based approach is preferred to other approaches for the easiness of management and visibility. However,

it severely sacrifices the achievement of inclusive policy objective (MOFA, 2013). In short, though Korean government establishes the integrated country strategy for ODA, project-based approach prevents Korean government from effectively actualizing its intended objective.

A short time of preparation can be suggested as a factor of incomplete transfer. According to the research of Kim et al. (2013), many developed countries did not have complete form of CPS at first. Developed countries including France are still in the process of improving CPS based on their experience. Compared to developed countries, Korea has a short history in terms of CPS, so Korean government does not have rich experience regarding the implementation of CPS. In addition, the lack of capacity in relevant organizations also attributes a short history of CPS. Personnel and financial resources tend to grow slowly when we consider the decision making process of the government, thus, resources for the development of CPS may not be secured in a short period of time.

Except all the factors listed above, many other factors were raised for the reason of incomplete transfer of CPS in Korea. Segregated ODA governance (Kim et al., 2013) and insufficient role of ODA governance (BAI, 2015) were also suggested as factors of

incompleteness of CPS in Korea. These factors should be examined for the successful implementation of CPS in Korea.

### 4.3. How Can CPS be Successful?

Evaluation on the effectiveness of CPS gives insights for the development of the policy. First, the government needs to provide sufficient opportunities for diverse stakeholders during the process of CPS. CPS is a country level document, so CPS needs to reflect all the actors of aid in a country. If CPS is not comprehensive, the partner countries will rather discuss with individual actors about aid programs, which may cause overlapping and dispersed aid. Relevant ministries, affiliated governmental agencies, non-governmental ODA organizations, and the local office of each agency need to be involved in the process of CPS. In order to promote active and representative participation, providing more information to diverse stakeholders should be accompanied.

Second, the government needs to pay more attention to policy dialogue with partner countries. According to the definition of ownership in the Paris Declaration on the Aid Effectiveness (2005), ownership is “Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption,” which means that the partner country should not remain passive regarding the aid. Partner countries need to have appropriate



information regarding the aid plan of donor countries and have opportunities to express their opinions to the donor country's aid policy. In this sense, ADB (2007) argued that policy dialogue "is a key outcome of the CPS processes" (p.15). However, Korean government did not allocate sufficient resources for the policy dialogue, so such practice was a target of criticism from OECD, researches, and NGOs. In order to have an in-depth understanding and communication regarding aid policy between both countries, a series of dialogue should be conducted rather than one or two times of pro forma meeting.

Third, the government needs to enhance the program-based approach in the ODA policy. Aid policies in Korea are often based on a project rather than a program (Kim & Kim, 2012). The project-based approach tends to concentrated on temporary business, unique objects, and technical assistances, while the program-based approach tends to focus on a related set of activities, outcomes, and capacity development (MOFA research, 2013). Although Korean government attempts to reduce the overlapping projects in the implementation of ODA, many projects are still similar and overlapping (CIDC, 2019), which means that CPS does effectively functioning yet. However, the second CPS

documents which was established in 2016 suggest individual projects as a basic unit of evaluation. When the government provides a small amount of aid to partner countries, there is a limitation to conduct the program-based approach, because donor countries may not implement a series of the project due to the limitation of resources. Thus, I recommend that the government gradually adopt a program-based approach from the closest partner countries, such as Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia. Cases of overlapping projects are most frequently found in those countries (CIDC, 2019).

Fourth, the government needs to provide more specific objects and indicators for the assessment of the ODA policy. Typically, the discourse regarding indicators assumes the existence of specific objects, thus, in this study, we will focus on indicators. Indicators can help to explain whether both countries are “on track toward achieving the intended outcome and to determine whether outcomes are achieved” (ADB, 2007). OECD DAC also emphasized the importance of indicators with regard to results: “The use of indicators is crucial in results reporting as indicators specify how expected results have been measured” (OECD DAC, 2012, 82). Obviously, Korean government utilizes indicators in its ODA


process, but it rarely shares indicators to stakeholders (OECD DAC, 2012). When the government select indicators, it needs to consider the specific situation of the partner country, data collection capacity, and the relationship between project/program and indicators. If the project is not expected to create a meaningful change of indicator, such indicator cannot be used. The government might not prepare indicators in every project/program. However, the government can gradually expand the application of indicators from certain sectors and certain countries.

Fifth, the government needs to monitor mutual commitments in the ODA programs for mutual accountability. Mutual accountability depends on trust and partnership. In order to increase mutual accountability, the government can utilize evidence which is collected by both countries (OECD DAC, 2008). CPS documents usually include the a monitoring process. CPS documents in Korea also include monitoring mechanism. The problem is that monitoring system is not sufficient for the enhancement of mutual accountability. Current monitoring mechanism in CPS documents is close to general principle regarding monitoring rather than specific procedures and plans. Since there were no effective monitoring system, the second CPS document


could not provide information regarding the monitoring results. In the absence of an effective monitoring system, both countries likely overlook the existence of CPS until they negotiate the next phase of CPS. Thus, in order to remind the importance of CPS for both countries, specific procedures and schedules should be provided.

**Figure 2:** Comparison between Current CPS and Proposed CPS.

### Current CPS



### Proposed CPS



## Chapter 5. Conclusion

### 5.1. Summary of Findings and Policy Implications


CPS is a good example of policy transfer because it is obvious that CPS is transferred from other countries. As the Gateway Review Process maintained its “brand” in policy transfer (Fawcett & Marsh, 2012), CPS has specific “brand”, and CPSs in different countries has in common its processes and contents. In addition, CPS did not exist in Korea before the bureaucrats in Korea learned about CPS from other countries. In this sense, we can claim that CPS in Korea transferred, which is the prerequisite of policy transfer study. Studies on policy transfer provide a useful framework to examine diverse aspects of CPS in Korea. Frames which were provided by policy transfer researchers help us to analysis the actors, origins, objects, degrees, constraints, reasons, and factors for policy success and failure in the formulation of CPS in Korea. Through the application of policy transfer frames, we can describe, explain, and prescribe CPS in Korea.

In the formulation of CPS in Korea, bureaucrats in Korea and


OECD DAC played an important role. OECD DAC recommended CPS, and bureaucrats in Korea actively learned cases of other countries and established CPS. Since Korea had to reference many countries' cases due to institutional differences, the degree of transfer was close to synthesis rather than copying and emulation. There were no significant constraints in formulating CPS in Korea. Although the segregation of ODA governance can be considered as a constraint, it was not critical to prevent Korean government from establishing CPS. It would be accurate that such factor delayed the process to some degree. For the reason of policy transfer, both voluntary and coercive factors influenced the adoption of CPS in Korea. Although OECD DAC strongly recommended the adoption of CPS strongly, Korean government were willing to improve its ODA policy, thus, voluntary aspects were strong. Regarding the outcome of policy transfer, there can be two different assessments depending on which dimension we focus on. In the dimension of process, although there are some weaknesses which need to be complemented, CPS in Korea seems to be successfully established. However, when we examine the programmatic dimension, many problems are identified. Current CPS in Korea is not sufficiently functioning, so more efforts need to be made.

Many studies on policy transfer have been criticized for their weaknesses in prescription. However, we could verify that the studies on policy transfer is not weak for the prescription. Policy transfer

**Figure 3:** Logic Model of CPS in Korea







theory provides a useful frame for the analysis of policy success and policy failure. Through utilizing evidence-finding, policy transfer theory provides strong suggestions for the improvement of policy. In our study, we identified that the process of policy transfer of CPS is incomplete rather than uninformed or inappropriate. Based on such recognition, we could focus on how to achieve completeness in the process of CPS. Specific recommendations, such as a series of policy dialogues, collaborative monitoring, a

program-based approach are suggested based on an in-depth examination of CPS in Korea. This study tried to verify that strong prescription can be derived from in-depth analysis of the policy process.

Many studies dealing with ODA policy in Korea has raised similar issues repeatedly. The segregation of ODA governance, secretiveness in the policy process, project-based approach, and weak strategy were the main targets of repetitive criticism. However, it is evident that these problems cannot be addressed in a short time. In this situation, CPS can be a good platform which promotes integration, transparency, program-based approach, and strategic implementation.

Policy learning is a common tool when policy-makers search for a solution for a certain problem. However, as we identified in the case of CPS, policy learning is easier processed than completed. The process of adopting some policies might not difficult if there are no significant constraints. However, the complete policy transfer requires continuous attention and a strong will from policy-makers. This is the lesson that we learned from the case of CPS and policy transfer theories.

## 5.2. Limitations of the Research and Directions for Future Research

Several limitations exist in this study. First, studies regarding CPS are not sufficient. Studies on policy transfer depend on the number of literature because it has to find as much evidence as possible for explanation. Many studies were conducted in a short period, from 2012 to 2015, a longitudinal approach was limited. Studies of non-governmental researchers were scarce so it is likely that the opinions of Korean government and OECD DAC are overrepresented. Majority of studies on CPS were focused on the selection of key partner countries. Second, the experience of policy-makers are not included. This study largely depends on all types of written documents, however, only using written documents as evidence has limitations, Written documents have limitations, including nuances, underlying intentions, informal events. If the interviews were utilized as complementary evidence, this study would have suggested a stronger explanation regarding the process of CPS. Third, quantitative data were not utilized. Although qualitative data provide solid evidence for the assessment of the policy, they are intrinsically subjective. The contents of data can be

different depending on the person who write the contents. In this sense, quantitative data can contribute to overcoming the limitation of qualitative data. Further studies are needed when more evidence is available in the future.

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국문 초록

# 정책이전의 관점에서 본 한국 공적개발원조 정책 연구

— 국가별협력전략을 중심으로 —

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국가별협력전략은 공여국이나 국제원조기관이 핵심적인 수원국들과 원조협력을 어떻게 해 나갈지에 관한 전략문서이다. 국가별협력전략은 보통 중점협력분야, 분야별 원조전략, 중장기 집행계획 및 평가계획을 포함하고 있으며 이러한 내용들은 수원국과의 협의를 통해 작성된다. 국가별협력전략은 국제원조기구에서 1990년대에 처음 소개되었으며, 점차 핵심적인 국제개발협력 정책으로 발전해왔다. 현재 국가별협력전략은 국가들의 원조정책의 질을 평가하는 핵심적인 지표 중 하나가 되었다.

한편 한국은 1950년 한국전쟁 이후 수원국의 위치를 유지해왔으나, 이후 강력한 경제발전에 힘입어 대외경제협력기금과 한국국제 협력단이라는 원조기구를 각각 1987년과 1991년에 창설하기에 이르렀다.



한국은 2000년에 선진원조공여국 모임인 경제협력개발기구 개발원조 위원회의 수원국 리스트에서 제외되었고, 2010년에는 선진원조공여국 모임의 일원이 되었다. 국제개발협력의 후발주자로서 한국은 국제원조 기구와 선진원조공여국의 정책들을 적극적으로 배우기 시작하였다. 이러한 맥락에서 한국 개발협력 정책의 많은 부분들이 전통적인 정책 형성모델보다는 외적 영향으로 형성되었다고 보는 것이 타당하다고 생각된다. 국가별협력전략은 외부의 정책을 채택한 전형적인 사례로 볼 수 있다. 비록 국가별협력전략에 대한 기본적인 문제의식은 2000년대 부터 있었으나 그 형태와 내용에 대한 완전한 인식은 경제협력개발기구 개발원조위원회의 권고 이후에 본격적으로 나타난다. 한국의 국제개발 협력 정책을 다루고 있는 다수의 문서들이 이러한 정책이전 과정의 증거를 제공하고 있다.

정책이전 이론은 한 제도의 정책에 관한 지식이나 사고가 다른 제도에 채택되는 과정을 의미한다. 이에 관한 이론은 관련된 정책과정을 설명하는 데 유용한 이론적 분석틀을 제공한다. 대표적인 연구는 돌로위츠와 마쉬가 1996년에 했던 연구이다. 이 연구는 정책행위자, 동기, 대상, 이전의 정도, 기원, 성공요인과 실패요인이라는 분석틀과 함께 정책이전의 다양한 특징들을 제시하고 있다. 본 논문은 한국의 국가별협력전략 정책을 돌로위츠와 마쉬의 연구에서 제시된 분석틀을 중심으로 분석하였다. 정책이전에 관해서 돌로위츠와 마쉬 이외에 많은 선행연구, 후행연구들이 있어 이들 연구들을 종합적으로 활용하였다. 베넷 (1991), 로즈 (1991), 돌로위츠와 마쉬 (2000), 에반스 (2004), 포셋과 마쉬 (2011), 돌로위츠 (2017) 등, 1990년대부터 비교적 최근의 연구까지 활용하였다.

한국의 국가별협력전략에서 주요 행위자는 경제협력개발기구 개발원조 위원회와 한국 정부의 관료들인 것으로 확인되었다. 정책이전의 동기는 강제적인 요소와 자발적인 요소가 복합적으로 작용한 것으로 보여진다.

정책이전의 대상은 개념, 목표, 중점협력분야와 협력과정 등을 포괄하는 전체적인 내용이다. 이전의 정도는 모방과 영감의 중간 단계인 혼합에 해당된다. 이전의 기원은 세계은행과 아시아개발은행 그리고 미국, 영국, 프랑스, 일본 등 선진원조공여국 들인 것으로 확인되었다. 국가별 협력전략에 관한 정책이전은 정책과정의 측면에서 성공적이었던 것으로 보인다. 하지만 불완전한 정책 이전으로 인해 기대했던 정책목적을 달성하지는 못했던 것으로 보인다. 이러한 분석결과들은 기본적으로 정부와 경제개발협력기구의 정책문서, 국가별협력전략에 관한 연구보고서 등에서 나타난 단서들에 기반해서 합리적으로 도출된 것이다.

이 연구는 한국 공적개발원조 정책에 몇 가지 함의를 제공한다. 첫째, 국제기구가 공적개발원조 정책에 행사하는 영향력이 매우 크다는 것을 확인하였다. 특히 경제협력개발기구의 개발원조위원회는 회원국에 대해 주기적인 평가를 실시하는데 각 회원국은 자국 정책에 대한 인식을 긍정적으로 유지하기 위해 이에 상응하는 대응을 할 수밖에 없다. 둘째, 한국의 공적개발원조 정책은 정책이전에 힘입어 상대적으로 짧은 기간 내에 형성이 되었는데 이러한 과정은 불완전하거나 피상적인 정책의 이전으로 이어질 수 있다는 것을 보여주었다. 셋째로, 공적개발원조가 성공적으로 이루어지기 위해서는 제도의 수입 이후에 그 정착을 위한 노력이 충분히 뒷받침되어야 한다는 것이다. 제도의 수입은 그 자체로는 성공적인 결과를 보장해주지 않는다. 채택된 제도에 대한 지속적인 개선 과정을 통해 제도의 장점을 최대한 활용하려는 노력이 필요하다.

이 연구의 한계는 다음과 같다. 먼저 한국의 국가별협력전략에 관한 자료가 충분하지 않았다는 것인데 이는 정책이전 연구에서 상당히 중요한 제약요건이다. 정책이전 연구는 특정한 생각이나 프로그램, 제도가 채택되었다는 구체적인 증거를 기반으로 발전될 수 있는데, 그러한 증거가 부족할 경우 심화된 연구를 진행할 여지가 줄어들기 때문이다. 한국 정부에서 국가별협력전략을 주요 정책으로 도입하는

과정에서 단계별로, 그리고 참여자들 별로 어떤 논의들이 제기되었는지에 대한 세부 자료들이 없었다는 것은 아쉬운 점이다. 아울러 국가별협력 전략에 대한 연구가 특정 시기에 편중되어 있고, 인터뷰 등 서면 이외의 자료를 포함하지 못하였고, 양적 자료들을 활용하지 못한 점은 연구의 객관성이나 설득력 측면에서 미흡한 요소로 작용했다.

**주요어 :** 정책이전, 국가별협력전략, 공적개발원조, 국제개발협력

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